Lens has no users table. The host Phoenix pipeline is the permission model, same as PgHero.

pipeline :require_admin do
  plug :browser
  plug MyAppWeb.Plugs.RequireAdmin
end

scope "/" do
  pipe_through :require_admin
  lens "/lens"
end

Audit actor is conn.assigns[:current_user] (configurable via actor_assign:). A struct with :id is stored as user:<id> — never the email.

The MCP server is a second entry point, not a second permission model. Mount PhoenixLensWeb.Plugs.MCP on the same host, issue project tokens in Settings → MCP, and treat those tokens like admin credentials. MCP audit rows use mcp:<token_id>. A stolen token cannot mint more tokens. See MCP.md.

Optional Settings → Security (authenticator app and passkeys) is an extra lock on the LiveView UI after the host pipeline has already let the operator in. MCP tokens skip it. PhoenixLens.Auth.reset!/0 clears enrollment from IEx if you lose the factor.

Prefer a Postgres role that can SELECT but not INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE on application tables, and point Lens at a replica:

config :phoenix_lens,
  repo: MyApp.Repo,
  databases: [
    analytics: [url: System.get_env("ANALYTICS_DATABASE_URL"), name: "Analytics"]
  ]

The replica user is a complement to application-layer masking, not a replacement. Masking still runs so aliases cannot leak configured fields through the UI.